The term 'referring expression' is often used without definition, and models of referring usually ignore the question of how NP's are recognized as referring expressions in discourse. In this paper, I review some relevant distinctions from the research in generics and, on that basis, provide a definition of referring expressions as specific and non-kind-referring noun phrases. I discuss some complications to the definition. Using Kronfeld's model of referring as my framework, I discuss the interaction of the recognition of referring expressions (...) and the recognition of relevant identification criteria. I propose that all present suggestions for identification constraints fall into three groups, and argue that the recognition of referring expressions always depends on the recognition of some identification constraints. On this basis, I extend the framework with procedural information. (shrink)

The term 'referring expression' is often used without definition, and models of referring usually ignore the question of how NP's are recognized as referring expressions in discourse. In this paper, I review some relevant distinctions from the research in generics and, on that basis, provide a definition of referring expressions as specific and non-kind-referring noun phrases. I discuss some complications to the definition. Using Kronfeld's model of referring as my framework, I discuss the interaction of the recognition of referring expressions (...) and the recognition of relevant identification criteria. I propose that all present suggestions for identification constraints fall into three groups, and argue that the recognition of referring expressions always depends on the recognition of some identification constraints. On this basis, I extend the framework with procedural information. (shrink)

Background: The division of non-paid labor in heterosexual parents in the West is usually still gender-based, with mothers taking on the majority of direct caregiving responsibilities. However, in same-sex couples, gender cannot be the deciding factor. Inspired by Feinberg’s ecological model of co-parenting, this study investigated whether infant temperament, parent factors (biological relatedness to child, psychological adjustment, parenting stress, and work status), and partner relationship quality explained how first-time gay, lesbian, and heterosexual parents divided labor (childcare and family decision-making) when (...) their infants were four months and 12 months old. We also tested whether family type acted as a moderator. Method: Participants were drawn from [MASKED FOR REVIEW]. Only those who provided information about their biological relatedness (yes or no) to their child (N = 263 parents) were included. When infants were four months (T1), parents completed a password-protected online questionnaire exploring their demographic characteristics including work status and standardized online-questionnaires on task division (childcare and family decision-making), infant temperament, parental anxiety, parental depression, parental stress, and partner relationship satisfaction. When infants were 12-months-old (T2), parents provided information about task division and their biological relatedness to their children. Results: Linear mixed models showed that no factor explained the division of family decision making at T1 and T2. For relative time spent on childcare tasks at T1, biological relatedness mattered for lesbian mothers only: biologically related mothers appeared to spend more time on childcare tasks than did non-related mothers. Results showed that, regardless of family type, parents who were not working or were working part-time at T1 performed more childcare tasks at T1. This was still true at T2. The other factors did not significantly contribute to relative time spent on childcare tasks at T2. Conclusion: We had the opportunity to analyze the division of non-paid tasks in families where parenting was necessarily planned and in which gender could not affect that division. Although Feinberg’s model of co-parenting suggests that various factors are related to task division, we found that paid work outside the home was most important during the first year of parenthood in determining caregiving roles. (shrink)

In 1710 G. W. Leibniz published Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil. This book, the only one he published in his lifetime, established his reputation more than anything else he wrote. The Theodicy brings together many different strands of Leibniz's own philosophical system, and we get a rare snapshot of how he intended these disparate aspects of his philosophy to come together into a single, overarching account of divine justice in (...) the face of the world's evils. At the same time, the Theodicy is a fascinating window into the context of philosophical theology in the seventeenth century. Leibniz had his finger on the intellectual pulse of his time, and this comes out very clearly in the Theodicy. He engages with all of the major lines of theological dispute of that time, demonstrating the encyclopaedic breadth of his understanding of the issues. Leibniz's Theodicy remains one of the most abiding systematic accounts of how evil is compatible with divine goodness. Any treatment of the problem of evil must, at some point, come to grips with Leibniz's proposed solution. This volume refreshes and deepens our understanding of this great work. Leading scholars present original essays which critically evaluate the Theodicy, providing a window on its historical context and giving close attention to the subtle and enduring philosophical arguments. (shrink)

The account of vagueness Bertrand Russell provided in his 1923 paper, entitled simply “Vagueness” (see Russell [1923]1997), has been thought by some to be inconsistent. One main objection, raised by Timothy Williamson (1994), is that Russell’s attempt early in the paper to distinguish vagueness from generality is at odds with the definition of vagueness he presents later in the same paper. It is as if, as Williamson puts it, Russell “backslides” from his previous distinction (1994, 60), resulting in a conflation (...) of generality and vagueness that is at best problematic for a rigorous account of the phenomenon of vagueness. In this paper, I will defend Russell from this particular objection. While his 1923 paper may not be as clear at various points as one might hope, I do believe it is possible to construct a single theory of vagueness that can be applied equally well to his earlier and later discussions. Thus, Russell’s view is not ultimately inconsistent. In this paper, I will first present the interpretation of Russell’s concept of vagueness that falls prey to the charge of conflating vagueness and generality. Once the problem is clear, I will present an alternative interpretation, one that arises from certain reflections on G. W. Leibniz’s theory of perception. This Leibnizian interpretation of Russell, I will argue, resolves the apparent contradiction in Russell’s account of vagueness. (shrink)

Content: Sprache, Recht und Rechtsverbindlichkeit: R. Fukawa: An Analysis of the aeRules of Recognition Statement' u W. Krawietz: What does it mean to follow an aeInstitutionalised Legal Rule'? u N. MacCormick: Citizens' Legal Reasoning and its Importance for Jurisprudence u Y. Morigiwa: Hart's Theories of Language and Law u R.Tuomela: Supervenience, Collective Action, and Kelsen's Organ Theory uRecht und politische Kultur: G. Haney: Recht als Form von Kultur u A. Kojder: Dysfunctionalities of Legal Cultur u A. Lopatka: Law and Religion (...) in Poland u M. Samu: Culture and Law: Legal Culture uWerteordnung als ideologische Basis des Rechtsstaats: R. Dreier: Konstitutionalismus und Legalismus u O. Maenpaa: Unilaterality and Consensualism in the Application of Law u K.-F. Lenz: Zivilprozea und Spiel u M. Pavcnik: Ideologie der Rechtsanwendung versus argumentierte Rechtsentscheidung u J. Uusitalo: Legal Dogmatics, Epistemology, Radical Hermeneutics u Entwicklung der Rechtsordnung und soziale Gerechtigkeit: V. Luizzi: Legal Validity and Justice u H. Rottleuthner: Recht und Technik in entwicklungstheor. Perspektive u S. Panou: Uber die aeGerechtigkeit' des Rechts u A. Squella: Legal Positivism and Democracy in the 20. Century u D. Wyduckel: Konsens und gesellschaftlich-technischer Fortschritt u Soziale Mechanismen der Rechtsanwendung und Rechtsfindung: H. Aoi: Richterliche Rechtsfindung als Pattern-Matching-Prozea uu.a. (Franz Steiner 1991). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Estelle R. Jorgensen, “Four Philosophical Models of the Relationship Between Theory and Practice”W. Ann StokesEstelle Jorgensen has written a most interesting paper contrasting four different concepts of the relationship between theory and practice, and pointing out the advantages and disadvantages of each. Each approach introduces insights that the others have missed, but is not sufficient in itself to explain all the relationships between theory and practice. In (...) response to the concept of "dichotomy," I am also sympathetic to the attempt to distinguish practice and theory because it identifies two important constituents of experience, and it provides a fruitful way of investigating the relationship between the two concepts. However, I believe that a concept of dichotomy may put the two categoriees in too distant a relationship with each other. This distance may prevent us from recognizing the "interconnections and cross-fertilizations" that are often possible between them.The idea of "polarity" opens up the possibility of focusing on the ground [End Page 102] between the two concepts. It also provides a framework for allowing "practice to bubble up into theory," and "theory to bubble up into practice." Given that a theory may bring about a range of different practices and that practices may be based upon a range of differing theories, one needs to be able to move easily between the two worlds. Imagination, intuition, and rational thinking all contribute to our understanding of the relationship between the two concepts. In this situation of polarity one should not expect to find "a theory perfectly translated into a particular practice, or a practice drawing entirely and fully on one particular theory."I am also sympathetic to the view that "theory without practice is mentalism," and that "practice without theory is activism or instrumentalism bare of guiding principles," but like Jorgensen I find the concept of fusion the least helpful of the four concepts. Given the fact that very rarely (if ever) is theory perfectly exemplified in practice, or practice based solely upon one specific theory, the concept of fusion in many instances is too absolute. I am open to the suggestion that moral principles as well as aesthetic ones should guide the practice of music education despite the difficulties that a multiplicity of perspectives opens up. I also agree that democratic ideals can offer us one way of guiding the decisions made in the classroom and can offer a rallying point for persons coming from different ethnic, religious, political, and cultural backgrounds.The dialectical approach opens up a way to negotiate among differences of opinion and beliefs that influence practice. It assumes that there is no one perfect perspective on the relationship between theory and practice. The dialectical approach provides (1)a framework to investigate the theories and practices of which practitioners are aware, (2)opportunities to examine how practitioners adjudicate them, and (3)explanations of how and why they decide to act "in their particular lived situations." In contrast to the ontological approach, I like Jorgensen's epistemological approach to the investigation of theory and practice. It offers another perspective in addition to the influence that ontological theories can have in guiding music education practice.My view of the ideal relationship between theory and practice is one that acknowledges the differences between the two concepts, but allows for a variety of relationships between the two. It is one that recognizes that theory should influence practice and that practice should influence theory in an ongoing and continuous reciprocal exchange. It entails being sensitive to a variety of theories and particular practices, and being skilled at being able to pick which particular theory or theories best explains the practice observed.In addition to the concepts of dichotomy, polarity, fusion, and dialectic, another possible concept of the relationship between theory and practice might be based upon Michael Lewis, Margaret Sullivan, and Linda Michalson's view [End Page 103] of the "cognitive-emotional fugue."1 This perspective has the advantage of being very flexible. The authors describe emotion and cognition as being neither separate nor independent processes. "Rather both are elements of a continuous, inseparable stream of behavior like the parts of a fugue in which the theme is often lost... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Estelle R. Jorgensen, “Four Philosophical Models of the Relationship Between Theory and Practice”W. Ann StokesEstelle Jorgensen has written a most interesting paper contrasting four different concepts of the relationship between theory and practice, and pointing out the advantages and disadvantages of each. Each approach introduces insights that the others have missed, but is not sufficient in itself to explain all the relationships between theory and practice. In (...) response to the concept of "dichotomy," I am also sympathetic to the attempt to distinguish practice and theory because it identifies two important constituents of experience, and it provides a fruitful way of investigating the relationship between the two concepts. However, I believe that a concept of dichotomy may put the two categoriees in too distant a relationship with each other. This distance may prevent us from recognizing the "interconnections and cross-fertilizations" that are often possible between them.The idea of "polarity" opens up the possibility of focusing on the ground [End Page 102] between the two concepts. It also provides a framework for allowing "practice to bubble up into theory," and "theory to bubble up into practice." Given that a theory may bring about a range of different practices and that practices may be based upon a range of differing theories, one needs to be able to move easily between the two worlds. Imagination, intuition, and rational thinking all contribute to our understanding of the relationship between the two concepts. In this situation of polarity one should not expect to find "a theory perfectly translated into a particular practice, or a practice drawing entirely and fully on one particular theory."I am also sympathetic to the view that "theory without practice is mentalism," and that "practice without theory is activism or instrumentalism bare of guiding principles," but like Jorgensen I find the concept of fusion the least helpful of the four concepts. Given the fact that very rarely (if ever) is theory perfectly exemplified in practice, or practice based solely upon one specific theory, the concept of fusion in many instances is too absolute. I am open to the suggestion that moral principles as well as aesthetic ones should guide the practice of music education despite the difficulties that a multiplicity of perspectives opens up. I also agree that democratic ideals can offer us one way of guiding the decisions made in the classroom and can offer a rallying point for persons coming from different ethnic, religious, political, and cultural backgrounds.The dialectical approach opens up a way to negotiate among differences of opinion and beliefs that influence practice. It assumes that there is no one perfect perspective on the relationship between theory and practice. The dialectical approach provides (1)a framework to investigate the theories and practices of which practitioners are aware, (2)opportunities to examine how practitioners adjudicate them, and (3)explanations of how and why they decide to act "in their particular lived situations." In contrast to the ontological approach, I like Jorgensen's epistemological approach to the investigation of theory and practice. It offers another perspective in addition to the influence that ontological theories can have in guiding music education practice.My view of the ideal relationship between theory and practice is one that acknowledges the differences between the two concepts, but allows for a variety of relationships between the two. It is one that recognizes that theory should influence practice and that practice should influence theory in an ongoing and continuous reciprocal exchange. It entails being sensitive to a variety of theories and particular practices, and being skilled at being able to pick which particular theory or theories best explains the practice observed.In addition to the concepts of dichotomy, polarity, fusion, and dialectic, another possible concept of the relationship between theory and practice might be based upon Michael Lewis, Margaret Sullivan, and Linda Michalson's view [End Page 103] of the "cognitive-emotional fugue."1 This perspective has the advantage of being very flexible. The authors describe emotion and cognition as being neither separate nor independent processes. "Rather both are elements of a continuous, inseparable stream of behavior like the parts of a fugue in which the theme is often lost... (shrink)

In the work of both Ludwik Fleck and Thomas Kuhn the scientific literature plays important roles for stability and change of scientific phenomenal worlds. In this article we shall introduce the analyses of scientific literature provided by Fleck and Kuhn, respectively. From this background we shall discuss the problem of how divergent thinking can emerge in a dogmatic atmosphere. We shall argue that in their accounts of the factors inducing changes of scientific phenomenal worlds Fleck and Kuhn offer substantially different (...) approaches, and we shall discuss in which respects their approaches may be compatible. (shrink)

`Proto-idea' was a central concept in the thinking of the Polish microbiologist and philosopher of science Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961). Based on studies of the origin of the modern concept of syphilis, Fleck claimed that many established scientific facts are best understood as interpretations of pre scientific, somewhat hazy `proto-ideas' in the framework of a certain `thought-style'. As an example,Fleck saw the modern knowledge of infection as an interpretation of the ancient proto-idea of diseases as caused by minute `animalcules'. However, the (...) epistemological aspects of the concept of proto-ideas have only been sparsely developed and discussed by Fleck and his critics. This paper attempts to bridge the gap. Firstly, I reconstruct the concept of proto-ideasin the context of Fleck's constructivist theory of knowledge. Secondly, I illustrate the relation between Fleck's concept of proto-ideas and his nominalist view on medical taxonomy. Finally, I discuss four philosophical problems implied by Fleck's concept of proto-ideas: (a) the problem of combining two conflicting perspectives on the history of science (b) the problem of accounting for the notion of` continuity' within a non realist theory of knowledge (c) the problem of ascribing no truth-content to proto-ideas, and (d) the problem concerning the non-neutrality of the analyst's viewpoint. (shrink)

The content of this book is essentially one argument. The aim of this book is to consider the breakdown of a certain world view during the twentieth century. This is mirrored in the treatment of both science and philosophy. As these form the foundation for the human position in the world, a major reorganization of the body of knowledge had to take place. Bohr and Wittgenstein have been chosen as the main actors to represent this revision. Each one had to (...) replace apparent order and certainty by an understanding based on limited concepts in constant flux. The conclusion is that the modern synthesis is far from satisfactory. By leaving the story unfinished in its present state, the book hopes to provoke a renewal of the discussion and the eventual emergence of a reformed clarity and understanding. Reality is to be left as it is, but the human mind is also to be left as it is. The problem is to find a way to effect a harmonious combination of these. (shrink)

I argue that inferences from highly probabilifying racial generalizations are not solely objectionable because acting on such inferences would be problematic, or they violate a moral norm, but because they violate a distinctively epistemic norm. They involve accepting a proposition when, given the costs of a mistake, one is not adequately justified in doing so. First I sketch an account of the nature of adequate justification—practical adequacy with respect to eliminating the ~p possibilities from one’s epistemic statespace. Second, I argue (...) that inferences based on demographic generalizations tend to disproportionately expose group members to the risks associated with mistakenly assuming stereotypical propositions, and so magnify the wrong involved in relying on such inferences without adequate justification. (shrink)

We consider the concept of entanglement for pure cases of finite dimensional state spaces. The criterion of unentangled states is related to demanding rank one of an associated eigenvalue problem. In addition to the conventional procedure based on the Schmidt decomposition, we devise a method based on the spectral resolution of unsymmetric matrices. In particular, we consider the case when all eigenvalues are zero, and find that the method still works.

I argue that the offense generation pattern of slurring terms parallels that of impoliteness behaviors, and is best explained by appeal to similar purely pragmatic mechanisms. In choosing to use a slurring term rather than its neutral counterpart, the speaker signals that she endorses the term. Such an endorsement warrants offense, and consequently slurs generate offense whenever a speaker's use demonstrates a contrastive preference for the slurring term. Since this explanation comes at low theoretical cost and imposes few constraints on (...) an account of the semantics of slurs, this suggests that we should not require semantic accounts to provide an independent explanation of the offense profile. (shrink)

Several authors have recently suggested that moral factors and norms `encroach' on the epistemic, and because of salient parallels to pragmatic encroachment views in epistemology, these suggestions have been dubbed `moral encroachment views'. This paper distinguishes between variants of the moral encroachment thesis, pointing out how they address different problems, are motivated by different considerations, and are not all subject to the same objections. It also explores how the family of moral encroachment views compare to classical pragmatic encroachment accounts.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 11.2 (2003) 130-140 [Access article in PDF] Western Classical Music and General Education Estelle R. Jorgensen Indiana University Thinking about transforming music, I address issues relating to the role of musicians in higher education and Western classical music in general education. I am concerned about this music because it is marginalized in general education and the civic spaces of public life. Where once it (...) held a privileged place, it seems now to have acquired (in some quarters at least) a negative connotation as a bastion of elitism and privilege. Instead, popular musics (with a nod to musics of other cultures) have pride of place in much elementary and secondary music education and in many university and college offerings designed for students whose principal fields of study lie outside music. An all-too-common musical illiteracy or, at best, elementary level of musical literacy and aurality renders Western classical music inaccessible to the general public just as the pervasiveness of popular music renders it inaudible and invisible. Bridges to past, less accessible, and esoteric traditions are also too few or in disrepair. Julian Johnson laments the diminished stature of Western classical music and argues for its values in today's world. 1Music teachers of all stripes urgently need to address this marginalization of Western classical music as a matter of public policy. If caring for and fostering [End Page 130] diversity in the natural world is a good, then it is reasonable to expect that fostering diversity in the cultural world is likewise a good. If preventing the extinction of natural species is a matter of public policy, then surely preventing the extinction of musics among other cultural traditions is at least as important. Social transformation has within it the seeds of conservation, or the preserving of past traditions, just as it also suggests profound and ongoing planned and unintended change. When any music such as Western classical music is sidelined, music education policy makers need to ask, Is this multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-faceted music important to keep, foster, and change? What does it have to contribute in the present world? Is it being cared for sufficiently? If it needs to change, how ought it be changed? What principles can be helpful to music teachers in caring for, fostering, and changing it? These are compelling public policy questions for our time. A Quarrel and Its Aftermath In 1963, participants in the Yale Seminar asked some of these very difficult questions of music education policy makers. MENC leaders took exception to the seminar and its conclusions; although some outstanding music teachers were participants, the organization had not been invited and the seminar was not its idea. 2 Instead of addressing directly some of the important criticisms of school music education and music teacher education raised in the seminar, the MENC mounted its own rival Tanglewood Symposium in 1967. Participants in this symposium faulted music in higher education for its failure to admit "talented and capable high school music students [to] the privilege of advanced study," the "[c]ompartmentalization and lack of communication between various segments of the music field," its lack of relation to "the musical heritage of American culture," and its failure to ensure arts courses in general education. 3 The symposium contributed to a populist stance focused on the myriad vernacular traditions of the world, thereby diminishing the role and presence of Western classical music and highlighting popular and vernacular musics at MENC conferences and in the elementary and secondary schools in the United States. Subsequent attempts to renew the Western classical tradition and raise the musical expectations of teachers and their students in the nation's schools exemplified in the Juilliard Repertory, Manhattanville Music Curriculum Project, and Comprehensive Musicianship Program seem not to have made a lasting impact. And the differing criticisms and visions of the Yale Seminar and Tanglewood Symposium have yet to be critically engaged.Summarizing criticisms made of school music repertoire in the report of the Yale Seminar to the Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 15.2 (2007) 150-160MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Songs to Teach a NationEstelle R. Jorgensen Indiana University, BloomingtonIn this symposium, I first briefly respond to Randall Allsup's piece, "Extraordinary Rendition: On Politics, Music, and Circular Meanings" with some general remarks on the distinctions between fundamentalism and liberalism, and internationalism, nationalism, and localism, and the importance of exercising judgment in order to find a middle ground between (...) extreme positions. Against this backdrop, I reflect on the songs we need to teach the nation to sing and, as a case in point, consider the National Anthem Project launched by the MENC—The National Association for Music Education. I suggest that at the very least the "Star-Spangled Banner" ought not be the only song to teach the nation at this time and it is important to carefully consider which songs we ought to teach the nation. And I propose that music teachers need to take a measured approach that eschews fundamentalism, rampant militarism, and excessive patriotism, embraces musically the tensions between internationalism, nationalism, and localism, and expresses a sensitive world-view through the choice of songs that cultivate and express liberal and democratic ideals and foster peace internationally.1Allsup's attention to the political character of research reminds us of the important consequences of any activity in the public and private spheres. Our endeavors as researchers are inherently ethical and have political consequences because as music teachers, we act on behalf of what John Dewey terms "the public."2 Dewey's "public" arises out of the need for social activities to be collectively organized, especially given the presence of the young, the poor, the ill, the elderly, the needy, and those who are otherwise dependent on others. Politics concerns the organization and governance of the public, that is the collective activities on behalf of society. For Dewey, educational activity cannot escape being ethical and political (construed positively) by the very fact of its undertaking on behalf of a public in the phenomenal world.3My understanding of fundamentalism is that it is, by definition, antithetical to liberalism. Whereas liberalism embraces surprise, entertains the possibility of doubt, and includes the "responsibility to choose,"4 fundamentalism is closed-minded and refuses to be surprised or to doubt the certainty of beliefs that have been accepted. Israel Scheffler notes that there is a safety in dogmatism in which one does not need to face the unsettlement of surprise that one might be wrong and one's beliefs mistaken.5 This quality of fallibility and openness to the possibility of surprise renders a liberal democracy fragile. Without cultivating [End Page 150] capacities and dispositions to open-mindedness and critical thought and action on the part of all the citizens of the democracy, it is open to being high-jacked by closed-mindedness and fundamentalism and thereby subject to dictatorial action on the part of those who seize political power.6 In difficult times, certainty may seem to be safer than open-mindedness that weighs possibilities and thinks through the complexities with which the public must deal. As Paul Woodford argues, if music education is to serve the interests of liberalism, it must likewise cultivate critical thinking and I add the caveat, as a means of defeating fundamentalism and literalism that would destroy liberal democracy.7Liberalism depends on the assertion of certain universal principles of ethical conduct. Seyla Benhabib's reconstruction of universals in what she terms her "post-Enlightenment project of interactive universalism" takes account of important postmodern, feminist, and communitarian insights and understands universals as "interactive not legislative, cognizant of gender difference not gender blind, contextually sensitive and not situation indifferent."8 In this frame, it is only possible to sustain liberalism on the assumption of action that takes for granted that others ought to agree with one and act in such-and-such ways. Whether these principles are referred to as "commonalities" or "universals" in the Benhabibian sense, one appeals to certain propositions on which ethical and political action should be predicated... (shrink)

This article studies the Islamic State's only remaining periodical, Al-Naba, identifying the most common tropes and patterns in the periodical's Sub-Saharan Africa coverage, and on Mozambique in particular. The Islamic State's increasingly important coverage of Africa focuses on terror attacks, military campaigns and on the fight against Christianity. However, it also employs more traditional anti-colonial arguments that have been used by other, more accepted, political actors during the struggle for decolonisation. Al-Naba also functions as a 'shamer' of non-African Muslims, to (...) get them to join jihad by pointing to the African successes of the organisation and set these successes up as examples to be followed. In this sense, the article illustrates how African jihadist branches can have global agency. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Four Philosophical Models of the Relation Between Theory and PracticeEstelle R. JorgensenSince music education straddles theory and practice, my purpose is to sketch the strengths and weaknesses of four philosophical models of the relationship between theory and practice. I demonstrate that none of them suffices when taken alone; each has something to offer and its own detractions. And I conclude with four suggested ways in which the analysis can (...) be helpful to music teachers and those interested in their work.Clarifying what is meant by theory and practice raises a nest of conceptual problems. Concerning theory, it may be tempting to equate the terms "theory" and "philosophy." Among their shared properties, these terms deal with conceptual and abstract entities that, from the Enlightenment at least, have been held to be distinct from the phenomenal world. They also clarify ideas and distinguish one concept from another. Among their different purposes, the object of philosophy is the asking of questions in a search for wisdom or truth whereas theory is formulated for explanatory purposes, especially within the frame of scientific propositions that can be refuted through empirical observations. The tests of philosophy are, therefore, those of symbolic logic evidenced in principles such as [End Page 21] internal consistency, correspondence with evidence (deductive, inductive, or analogical), and coherence within a unity or whole. Although logical criteria may also be important in formulating and testing theory,1 it is tested and refuted primarily through means of qualitative descriptions and quantitative assessments of observable phenomena.Regarding practice, one is also confronted with an ambiguous construct that may be interpreted descriptively (what is done in the phenomenal world or taken to be the general state of affairs) or normatively (what is desirable or ideal). There is also the distinction between the practice of a seasoned performer and practice in the sense of striving towards the mastery of a competent and expert practice. In this regard, Vernon Howard distinguishes between "practice" (or the skills exemplified by proficient or expert performers) and "practise (or acquiring the level of mastery of proficient or expert performance)."2 For him, the ambiguous and paradoxical nature of artistic practice highlights the complexity of degrees of attaining mastery of skills or exemplary practice and the diverse array of skills ranging from habit to critical thinking involved in the practice of any art. Although each practice is distinguished by its own belief systems, rituals, expectations, and commonsense, boundaries between differing practices are sometimes "soft" or fuzzy, as one seeps into another.3 Consequently, it is often difficult to distinguish one from another at the margins where one practice becomes another.DichotomyThe notion of theory and practice as independent or a dichotomous relationship between the phenomenal world on the one hand and the mind and spirit on the other has its roots in the ancient world. For Plato, the world of "appearances," referring to the phenomenal world understood by imagination (eikasia) and belief (pistis), should be distinguished from the higher, abstract "intelligible world" grasped through thinking (dianoia), knowledge (episteme), and intelligence (noesis).4 René Descartes' later bifurcation of the inner and outer worlds and inversion of Platonic values and understandings resulted in the ascendancy of careful and deliberate observation of the phenomenal world over philosophical reflection.5 His ideas helped to set the stage for the Enlightenment and the Industrial, Scientific, and Information Revolutions. Empiricism, science, and technology gradually displaced philosophy as primary ways of knowing the phenomenal world and understanding the nature of mind, human cognition, feeling, and being. Making hard-boundaried distinctions between within and without one's self, the phenomenal world and the world of spiritual things, and theory and practice were important insights. These distinctions provided for limits on the sorts of ways in which truth could be known. Reasoned deliberation [End Page 22] and imaginative thought have particular usefulness in the world of theory while sensory perception and careful observation are especially useful in the phenomenal world of practice. So while the scholar might speculate about phenomena, observational tools are also useful in coming to know and understand them. Reason and observation each have particular strengths, and it ought not be assumed that philosophy or scientific observation... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reflections on Futures for Music Education PhilosophyEstelle R. JorgensenIn 1990, when I convened the first International Symposium for the Philosophy of Music Education at Bloomington, Indiana, there was one dominant philosophy of music education in the United States and another was about to make its appearance. The five succeeding symposia (Toronto, Canada, in 1994, led by David Elliott; Los Angeles, United States, in 1997, led by Anthony Palmer and (...) Frank Heuser; Birmingham, United Kingdom, in 2000, led by Mary Reichling and Forest Hansen; Lake Forest, Illinois, United States, in 2003, led by Iris Yob, Frank Heuser, and Forest Hansen; and Hamburg, Germany, in 2005, led by Charlene Morton, Paul Woodford, Frede Nielsen, and Jürgen Vogt) have promoted other philosophies. And this burgeoning of different voices and perspectives has greatly enriched the philosophical underpinnings of music education and moved us from relying on a narrow range of philosophical views towards a plethora of them.In our infant society, the International Society for Philosophy of Music Education (ISPME), we are creating and institutionalizing a forum that can nurture and critique ideas and practices and sustain the work of philosophical reflection in music education over the longer term. We have also benefited from long-term commitments by the Indiana University School of Music and Indiana University [End Page 15] Press to publishing the Philosophy of Music Education Review, now in its fourteenth volume (building on three years of publication of the Philosophy of Music Education Newsletter), and the Counterpoints: Music and Education series that provides an important venue for publishing cutting-edge scholarship in our field. And over the past two years, we have begun to build an international team of philosophers committed to establishing a strong philosophical society in music education.Beyond institutionalizing philosophical scholarship in music education, our society is committed to creating a genuinely international community that offers a global perspective. In the past, music education grew up within national borders and its work was often nationalistic in emphasis. Now, we face new challenges of thinking beyond these national commitments to a world of music education. This world might be seen as what Maxine Greene aptly terms "multiplicities and pluralities,"1 the many differing groups forged within language groups, religious perspectives, political ideologies, economic strictures, and familial obligations. And as philosophers, we work especially within our various linguistic and cultural traditions as we also seek to transcend these traditions in a common discourse.How shall we address philosophically the multiplicities and pluralities, commonalities and differences in music education internationally? Radical relativism and pluralism offer contrasting perspectives.2 Radical relativism sees the host of different music education beliefs and practices around the world as incommensurable and focuses on differences between them. For example, viewing Japanese and British music education within this stance would suggest that since Japanese and British music education reflect Japanese and British society and culture respectively, each cannot be understood in terms of the other, they are different and incommensurate with the other, and it is important to understand each in its own terms. Pluralism, however, sees differences as commensurable and focuses on shared attributes. Since human beings are the creators of culture and society, common threads amidst the differences emerge from this common humanity. For example, as a reflection of their different societies and cultures, although we expect to encounter differences between British and Japanese music education, we may also observe commonalities since they both bear the imprint of a shared humanity.Notwithstanding that musics and educational systems seem, upon first glance and when considered specifically, to be incommensurable, a deeper and more general examination turns up evidence supporting a pluralist perspective.3 Historically, cultures regularly borrow from different others as if there were common human threads. Maurice Ravel, Carl Orff, and Paul Simon are among twentieth-century composers to draw on cultures from the Far East and Africa. In music [End Page 16] education, Masafumi Ogawa's study of the introduction of Luther Whiting Mason's ideas into Japan in the nineteenth century,4 the dissemination of Shinichi Suzuki's ideas into the United States, the spread of Zoltán Kodály's, Émile Jaques-Dalcroze's, and Carl Orff's and Gunild... (shrink)

Technology is increasingly subject of attention from philosophers. Philosophical reflection on technology exhibits a wide and at times bewildering array of approaches and modes of thought. This volume brings to light the development of three schools in the philosophy of technology. Based on thorough introductions to Karl Marx', Martin Heidegger's and John Dewey's thought about technology, the volume offers an in-depth account of the way thinkers in the critical, the phenomenological and the pragmatic schools have respond to issues and challenges (...) raised by the works of the founders of these schools. Technologies in almost any aspect of human life is potentially subject of philosophical treatment. To offer a focused demonstration of key arguments and insights, the presentation of each school is concluded with a contribution to discussions of educational technologies. In addition to philosophers seeking a valuable and clear structuring of a still burgeoning field, the volume is of interest to those working with educational philosophy and value sensitive design. „Stig Børsen Hansen’s book is a must for all interested in understanding the development of the philosophy of technology and the relation of thoughts of thinkers that have shaped the area. The author presents a new and refreshing take on the ideas from Marx to Marcuse, from Dewey to Latour, and Heidegger to Borgmann. It will engage and hopefully provoke." Dr. Jan Kyrre Berg Friis, University of Copenhagen. (shrink)